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This paper presents a wage bargaining model in which the employer
and employee are each uncertain about the other's reservation wage.Under
specified circumstances, the model's equilibrium is shown to involve unilat-
eral wage setting and inefficient labor turnover.In addition, aggregate
demand shocks affect the equilibrium in a way that produces procyclical
quits and countercyclical layoffs.These results are obtained without













ABSTRACTWAGE BARGAINING, LABOR TURNOVER, AND THE BUSINESS CYCLE:
A MODEL WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION
1. Introduction
The paramount challenge in macroeconomics is to bridge
the gap between microeconomic theory and macroeconomic
phenomena. On one hand, standard microeconomic models of
optimizing behavior imply efficient employment and output
arrangements; on the other hand, the magnitude of aggregate
employment and output fluctuations and their apparent
sensitivity to nominal shocks suggest that these
fluctuations are not efficient. The two main efforts to
resolve this paradox have been the Keynesian and equilibrium
models of the business cycle. In the Keynesian models,
nominal wage rigidity combines with unilateral employment
determination by the employer to produce inefficient
unemployment. But, as Barro (1979) and others have argued,
a fully satisfying theoretical explanation of nominal wage
rigidity is lacking; furthermore, regardless of the wage-
setting mechanism, it is unclear why, in long—term
employment relationships, employers and employees would not
cooperate to achieve efficient employment arrangements.
In contrast, the equilibrium models impose no wage
rigidities, but assume that workers are imperfectly informed
of aggregate price movements. The labor supply and/or job
search response to the resulting discrepancies between
actual and perceived real wages produces fluctuations in
employment and output. But Okun (1980) and others have
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questioned the plausibility of population-wide
misperceptions of aggregate prices. Moreover, the
equilibrium models provide no explanation of observed
countercyclical layoff patterns, and they predict
countercyclical quits rather than the procyclical quits
actually observed.
More recently, implicit—contract theorists have
explained inefficient employment arrangements as a
consequence of information asymmetries between employers and
employees. In some models, such as Grossman and Hart
(1981), employers and employees are bound together in long—
term relationships in which asymmetric information and risk
aversion lead to temporary layoff unemployment. In other
models, such as Hall and Lazear (1984), bilaterally
asymmetric information produces permanent quits or layoffs
that are inefficient relative to the full—information
outcome. Few of these models, however, attempt to explain
how employment outcomes and their efficiency vary over the
business cycle in response to aggregate price shocks. In
addition, as Hart (1983) has noted, the implicit—contract
models raise difficult enforceability issues.
The present paper further explores the implications of
asymmetric information without assuming long-term
contracting. Instead, we present a wage bargaining model in
which the employer and employee are each uncertain about the
other's reservation wage. The employer and employee make
offers and counteroffers until either they reach agreement3
or one side terminates the relationship through a quit or
layoff. Even after agreement is reached, either side may
reopen wage negotiations at any time, particularly when
economic conditions change.
We show, under specified circumstances, that unilateral
wage setting is the only equilibrium outcome of this model.
The party that does not set the wage sometimes terminates
the employment relationship through a quit or layoff.
Furthermore, which party sets the wage and the resulting
type of labor turnover are sensitive to the direction of
shocks to the aggregate economy. Positive aggregate demand
shocks shift the power to set wages to employers, who then
shade their wage offers below the value of the employees'
work. Some employees then quit their existing jobs even
though, in some cases, they are less productive in their
alternative jobs. Similarly, negative demand shocks shift
wage—setting power to employees, who shade their offers
above their best alternative wages. This results in
layoffs, some of which occur even though the workers would
be most productive if they stayed in their existing jobs.
Thus, the model's equilibrium, which is inefficient relative
to the full—information outcome, responds to aggregate
demand shocks in a way that produces procyclical quits and
countercyclical layoffs. The model therefore explains
important features of aggregate labor market fluctuations
without relying on controversial assumptions of nominal wage4
rigidity, enforceability of implicit long—term contracts, or
aggregate price misperceptions.
In the next section, we develop a game-theoretic model
of wage bargaining and labor turnover, and we present our
basic result on the model's equilibrium. Section 3 explores
the model's implications for the business cycle, and Section
4 summarizes our findings.
2. The Model
Our basic model describes wage bargaining between an
employer and an employee with one indivisible unit of work
to sell. At time t=O, they have a predetermined wage w0
which is paid every period as long as they stay together
without agreeing on a new wage.2 The employer is
identified by me[m,i], which is his valuation of the
employee's work. The employee is identified by re(r,r],
which is his best wage opportunity in the outside market.
Throughout the paper, m and r will be referred to as
"reservation wages" although they turn out not to be the
wages the parties actually offer when bargaining. Because
of the accumulation of specific human capital3 in the
existing employment relationship, m usually exceeds r, and
we assume r<rn and i<i. The special nature of the existing
relationship produces a bilateral monopoly situation in
which the employer and employee must bargain over how to
split rent. In contrast, the employee's best alternative
wage •r is assumed to equal his best alternative marginal
product, so that no bargaining situations arise in the5
alternative market. The implicit assumption is that the
number of type r alternative employers is large enough to
bid the alternative wage up to the alternative marginal
product.
Information in this model is bilaterally asymmetric.
Each party knows his own reservation wage but is uncertain
about the other's. The employee's information about m is
summarized by the subjective probability distribution F(m);
the employer's information about r is summarized by G(r).
These distributions are common knowledge.
The bargaining game proceeds as follows. At time t=O,
each party decides whether to move first. If only party
ie[r,m} chooses to start, he immediately makes an initial
wage offer. Then the other party j either accepts the
offer, rejects it and leaves the game (thus terminating the
relationship), or chooses to wait until period t=l to make a
counteroffer. In the latter case, the game continues
similarly in period t=l and so on, except that before each
period there is a probability q that the game is terminated
by "nature." This chance of exogenous termination reflects
the possibility that a new shock to the economy will change
the information structure of the game and thus initiate a
new game between the same parties.4
The game G1, in which party i moves first, is shown
schematically in Figure 1. If both parties want to move
first, the initiating party is chosen by a random device,
and the game then proceeds as shown in Figure 1.If neither6
party wants to move first, each chooses whether to leave or
to wait until t=l. If both choose to wait, then the process
is reiterated in t=l. In any case, the game has three
possible outcomes: (1) agreement on wage w at time t;
(2) termination of the game (by nature or by a party's
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The payoffs to parties m and r are described by the von
Neumann—Morgenstern utility functions Um( )andUr( )If
agreement is reached on wage w at time t, the employerts
payoff Is Um[s(m_w)+t(m_w0fl where s is the agreement's7
duration, which depends stochastically on future events.5
The employee's payoff is tjrEs(w_r)+t(w0_r)]. If the game
terminates with no agreement after t periods, then s is zero
and the payoffs are UmEt(m_wü)] and Tir[t(w0_r)]. The
functions )andUr( )areassumed to be strictly
increasing with u' ()￿e>Oand are subject to the
normalization TJ(O)=O, but no further assumptions regarding
their properties are necessary. Payoffs on uncertain
outcomes are obtained by standard expected utility
calculations of EUm( )andEU( ).
Whatremains is to describe the equilibrium of the
game. We will use the concept of "sequential equilibrium,"
which extends "perfect equilibrium" to games with incomplete
information. This equilibrium concept requires that, at
each stage of the game (including out-of-equilibrium
points), each party's strategy for the remainder of the game
must be Nash—optimal. For a detailed discussion, see Kreps
and Wilson (1982).
Before we state the main theorem, we define
(m) =argmaxG(w) EtJm[s(mw)],
which is employer m's optimal wage offer given that any
employee with r￿w accepts and any employee with r>w quits.
Similarly,
=argmax(l—F(w)) EUr[s(wr)]
is employee r's optimal offer given that any employer with
m￿w accepts and any employer with m<w lays the employee off.8
Theorem: If r>w0 for all reEr,r], then the only equilibrium
play is:
(i) An employer of type m chooses to move first and make
an offer of (m).
(ii) An employee of type r chooses not to move first and
then to accept any offer w￿r and to quit if w<r.
(When m<w0 for all me[rn,it], the theorem is completely
symmetrical with the employee offering (r) and the employer
either accepting or laying the employee off.)
The proof, which is similar to the one presented by
Perry (1983) for a different game, is rather lengthy and is
therefore relegated to an appendix. Here we provide an
intuitive discussion of the result. Note first that, in the
case where r>w0 for all re[r,r], both parties know they are
negotiating a wage increase. The longer the negotiation
takes, the longer the employer gets to pay the lower wage
w0. This gives the employer asort of bargaining advantage
that confers on him the opportunity to make the initial wage
offer. Since the theorem indicates that no counteroffers
are made, this power to make the initial offer is equivalent
to unilateral wage—setting power.
The no—counteroffer result may seem surprising because
the model allows indefinite bargaining and one might expect
the parties to use counteroffers as bluffing devices. For
example, after the employer made an initial offer, the
employee could respond with a very high counteroffer in an
effort to convince the employer that the employee's9
alternative r was unusually high. The employer, however,
would realize that this stratagem was available to any
employee, regardless of his true r, and therefore would
refuse to change the original offer. Consequently, the
employee understands that bargaining would be pointless and
would only prolong his receiving the low preexisting wage
w0. Instead, he simply accepts the employer's initial offer
if w￿r and quits in favor of his superior alternative if
w<r. As detailed in the appendix, a similar analysis
explains why the employee chooses not to make the initial
wage offer.
Finally, it is worth noting that, in this equilibrium,
separations may occur that are inefficient relative to the
full—information equilibrium. As will be illustrated in the
next section, in the situation where r>w0 for all re(r,r],
the employer shades his wage offer w below m in an effort to
capture monopoly rent. In cases where w<r, the employee
then quits even though his alternative productivity r may be
less than his productivity m on his current job. Similarly,
in the synunetric situation where m<w0 for all me[,rn], the
employee shades his wage offer w above r.In cases where
m<w, the employer than lays the employee off even though m
may exceed r. In the next section, we discuss how these
outcomes vary over the business cycle and present an
illustrative example.10
3.The Business Cycle
In this section, we characterize the case where r>w0
for all re[r,] as being more prevalent after a positive
aggregate demand shock than at other times. The idea is
that a positive shock tends to shift some workers'
alternative nominal wages above their preexisting nominal
wages in their current jobs. These new conditions lead to
wage renegotiations of the type analyzed in the previous
section. Similarly, a negative aggregate demand shock tends
to reduce some workers' nominal productivities below their
preexisting wages in their current jobs, again initiating a
new wage bargaining game. Positive and negative shocks,
however, differ in their implications for which party
assumes the power to set wages. As a result, aggregate
price disturbances may have real effects on employment
arrangements because they shift the balance of power in wage
bargaining.
Consider the following simple example. Suppose that,
in the current state of the economy, r and m are drawn
independently from uniform distributions, with r ranging
from 3/2 to 5/2 and m from 2 to 3. The higher tendency of m
is due to accumulation of specific human capital in the
existing employment relationship. The set of all possible
(and equally likely) pairs of r and m is demarcated by the
smaller box in Figure 2. In all pairs below the 45 degree
lines, m exceeds r and continuation of the employment











line, separation is efficient. Notice that, regardless of
the type of wage bargaining that occurs in this state, no
wage can be higher than 3 because this is the highest value
of m.
Now suppose a demand shock doubles the aggregate price
level so that r is now uniformly distributed between 3 and 5
and inbetween4 and 6. The new joint distribution appears
as the larger box in Figure 2.In the aggregate, this shock
may be purely nominal in the sense that, aside from the
nominal change in scale, the joint distribution is the same
as before. For an individual employer or employee, however,
the example's shock is also real in that the new r's and m's
are drawn independently of their previous values, This is
an extreme characterization of the fact that relative shocks
occur continually in the economy at the sane time that
aggregate shocks arise.' In equilibrium models such as
Lucas' (1981), it is individuals' inability to separate
these two types of shocks that leads to business cycles. In
the current model, however, employers and employees are
perfectly informed about the magnitude of aggregate shocks
and about their own reservation wages; they are uncertain
only about the other party's reservation wage.
In the new state of the economy, r>3 for all workers so
that r>w0 for all re[r,fl. Consequently, the theorem of the
previous section applies to all existing employment
relationships in the economy. Therefore, as a result of the13
upward price shock, employers set new wages, and employees
either accept them or quit their jobs.
For example, if employers are risk-neutral, they set
wages to maximize G(w)E(m—w)/q] where G( )isthe cumulative
uniform distribution function ranging from 3 to 5. A simple
calculation of the first-order condition shows that an
employer of type m offers a wage of (m+3)/2. This wage—
of fer function is shown as the broken line in Figure 2. The
employee accepts the wage offer if it exceeds r; otherwise
he quits in favor of his best alternative job. Quits
therefore occur for all pairs of r and m above the broken
line. Some of these pairs lie below the 45 degree line, so
that inefficient separations arise.
If the aggregate price level were then to drop by half,
so that the smaller box in Figure 2 applied again, the
analysis would work in reverse. Now m would be less than
the preexisting wage for all me[rn,nl), and employees would
make new wage offers which employers would accept or respond
to with layoffs. The employees would shade their offers
above their r's, and some of the resulting layoffs would
occur even though the employees would be more productive in
their old jobs than in their alternative jobs.
Several points are worth highlighting. First, in
accordance with the stylized facts on labor turnover, this
model of wage bargaining over the business cycle generates
procyclical quits and countercyclical layoffs. Previous
equilibrium models of the business cycle have failed to14
predict these turnover patterns, while Keynesian models have
required assumptions of nominal wage rigidity. In the
present model, wages are renegotiated when economic
conditions change, but uncertainty of the employer and
employee about each other's exact economic circumstances
prevents wage adjustments from achieving efficient
employment outcomes. Furthermore, the direction of an
aggregate price shock determines the identity of the wage—
setting party and hence imparts a cyclical pattern to the
form of labor turnover.
Second, unemployment could be incorporated in the
analysis if r were viewed as the employee's best alternative
use of time, either on another job or at home. An employee
for whom home time was the best alternative would then
become unemployed if he quit or were laid off.
Interestingly, this unemployment would be voluntary in one
sense and involuntary in another. Consider the case of an
employee who, after a negative demand shock, makes a wage
offer w and is then laid off into unemployment by his
employer, whose m is less than w. In principle, the
employee could avoid unemployment by offering a wage no
greater than m. Given his inability to observe m, though,
his higher wage offer is an optimal choice. Furthermore,
even after being told he would be laid off, lowering his
wage offer would not be an equilibrium strategy. Otherwise,
the employer would always threaten a layoff, regardless of
the true rn, to bargain down the wage rate. From his own15
viewpoint, then, the unemployed worker is constrained from
working at what appears to him to be a "reasonable" wage.
Third, the analysis has some obvious limitations. To
begin with, the theorem's determinate equilibrium pertains
only to aggregate shocks extreme enough to shift the whole
distribution of r or m to one side of the preexisting wage
w0. Hall and Lazear's (1984) analysis suggests that less
extreme shocks also would yield inefficient separations, but
then it is no longer clear how wage and employment decisions
would be made. Furthermore, although our model generates
procyclical quits and countercyclical layoffs and can
produce cyclical movements in other real variables as well,
real output is not necessarily higher after positive demand
shocks than after negative shocks. Finally, it is by no
means clear what role, if any, the model implies for
countercyclical government policy.
4.Summary
Thispaper has presented a model of wage bargaining
with bilaterally asymmetric information. The equilibrium
outcomes involve unilateral wage setting and inefficient
labor turnover. The paper also has described how bargaining
might be affected by aggregate demand shocks. The resulting
procyclical quits, countercyclical layoffs, and quasi—
involuntary unemployment conform to stylized facts of the
aggregate labor market. These results do not depend on
assumptions of nominal wage rigidity or implicit long—term
contracts. On the contrary, the model allows renegotiation16
whenever conditions change. Nor does the model assume
misperceptions of aggregate prices. All that is required is
that each party is uncertain of the other's reservation wage
and is aware of the direction of aggregate demand shocks.
The model leaves many questions unanswered, but it
illustrates the potential of information asymmetries for
explaining the sensitivity of microeconomic allocation
decisions to aggregate price shocks.17
Appendix
The strategy for proving the theorem is first to show
that plays involving either the employee's moving first or
the employee's making counteroffers are not equilibria.
Then we show that the play described in the theorem j an
equilibrium.
First, suppose there is a specific sequential
equilibrium for the game G', in which the employee r makes
the first offer and both parties eventually agree on the
wage w. Let R be the set of employees who play this game,
and let r=sup{R}. We can then establish two useful claims.
Claim 1: w￿r.
Proof of claim 1: The proof is by contradiction. We will
show that, if there exists an equilibrium wage w>r for some
pair of players (r,m), then there must exist another pair
(r',m') with equilibrium wage w'￿w+& where >O. Since w'>r,
this argument can be repeated sufficiently many times to
show that for some pair there is an equilibrium wage w">rn,
which is impossible because any employer would prefer
leaving the game to accepting such a wage.
Assume that some pair (r,m) does agree on a wage w>r.
This agreement can be reached in two ways:(1) at some
stage of the game, employee r offers w and employer m
accepts, or (ii) employer m offers w and employee r accepts.
In case (i), why doesn't the employer reject the offer
w and wait one period to make a counteroffer of the same w?18
Since w>r, no employee would quit in response to that
counteroffer. (The fact that the game might be terminated
by nature does not alter the employer's calculation.)
Therefore, there must be some employee who would respond
with a counteroffer. Because such an employee loses at
least w—w0 by turning down the employer's offer, there must
be some employer m' with whom he can reach an agreement on
wage w'>w+5, where >0 is a fixed number great enough to
compensate this loss.
In case (ii) where the employer offers w, why doesn't
he offer W—E instead? By the same reasoning as above, one
can conclude that for some pair (r',m') there is an
equilibrium wage w'>w—e+7, where 7>0 is just great enough to
compensate employee r' for foregoing the offered w—e.
Clearly, for small enough e,thereexists ó>0 such that
We+7>W+ó.
Having established claim 1, we now proceed to the
second claim.
Claim 2: Agreement on w can be reached in only one way
——theemployer offers w and the employee accepts.
Proof of claim 2: Assume the opposite, that in some cases
the employee offers w and the employer accepts. Now let R
be this set of employees and r=sup{R}. Clearly, w￿ because
no employee would offer a wage below his reservation wage.
But why does the employer accept instead of waiting one
period to offer w? Since the employee would not quit in19
response to this offer, there must be some employee who
would respond with a counteroffer. But, because such an
employee loses at least w-w0 by turning down w, there must
be some employer with whom he can reach an agreement on wage
w'>w+ó whereis sufficient to compensate the loss. But
then the same reasoning used in claim 1 suggests that there
must be still another employer with whom the employee could
agree on wage w">w'+6. The argument can be reiterated until
one obtains a wage agreement w"'>rn, which is impossible.
With the help of claims 1 and 2, we can now prove the
theorem. First consider an equilibrium play in which some
employees choose to move first. Let R be the set of such
employees and r=sup{R}. By claim 1, the employee cannot
hope for a wage higher than r. By claim 2, he has to wait
at least one period before agreement is reached. Hence.his
payoff cannot be more than EUr[s(rr)_(r_w0)], which is less
than Ur(O)=O for any r'eR close enough to r. But then r'
would have preferred quitting the game without making any
offer. Therefore, a play in which some employees move first
cannot be an equilibrium.
Next consider an equilibrium in which some employees
choose to make a counteroffer.If we let R be the set of
such employees and r=sup{R}, the analysis in claims 1 and 2
applies to this situation as well. These claims result in
the same type of contradiction for this play as for the one
in the paragraph above.20
Finally, we must show that the play described in the
theorem can be an equilibrium. To define a complete
strategy for an employer or employee, we need to specify his
behavior in all contingencies, including out—df-equilibrium
ones. Actually, there are many equilibrium pairs of
strategies that produce the outcome described in the
theorem. We will describe only one.
The strategy for employee r is as follows. Regardless
of his type, he chooses not to move first. At any
subsequent information set of the employee, he leaves the
game if the employer either chooses not to make an offer or
makes an offer less than r; otherwise, the employee accepts.
Employer m's strategy is to move first and then to offer
(m) under any information set, unless he has just been
offered w<(m), in which case he subsequently offers w. At
each stage, the employee's beliefs about the employer are
summarized by the distribution F( ).Theemployer's prior
beliefs about the employee are summarized by the
distribution G( ).Theemployer's beliefs are then updated
in light of wage offers from the employee, given the
employer's awareness that r must be less than these offers.
It is simple to check that, at each stage of the game,
each player's strategy constitutes an optimal response to
that player's beliefs and the remainder of the other
player's strategy.21
Footnotes
'The empirical evidence on cyclical turnover patterns
is surveyed in Parsons (1977).
2We assume that the employer-employee relationship can
be perpetuated only by wage payments for ongoing work.
Consequently, strikes and lockouts are precluded.
3See Becker (1962) and 01 (1962) for detailed analyses
of specific human capital. Specific human capital may be
interpreted to include not only specific job skills, but
also any other hiring or mobility costs.
4The possibility of future games between the same
employer and employee does not affect the equilibrium
strategies in individual games. The reason is that a threat
which would not be credible in a single game (e.g., "pay me
an exorbitant wage or I'll quit") could be "backed up" in a
multiple—game setting only by following through on the
threat to terminate the relationship. But, once the
relationship is terminated, having established the
credibility of the threat is worthless because there are no
reputation effects on third parties in our model.
5This formulation of the utility function assumes that
w will not affect the outcomes of future games, which is
correct under the specific conditions of our theorem. More
generally, we could write the expected payoff to the
employer as Vm[w,t(m_w0)] where 8vm/3w￿e<O and
avm/att(m—wo)]￿e>O. The results would be unaffected.22
'In a world with only nominal aggregate shocks, wage
agreements might incorporate complete indexation, in which
case our results on cyclical patterns would not apply. In
the absence of explicit long—term contracts, however, it is
unclear how such agreements would be enforced. More
generally, in a world with relative shocks also, it is
unclear whether employers and employees would agree to
complete indexation even if it could be enforced. (Even
explicit collective bargaining agreements often lack
indexation provisions, especially if the agreements cover
periods of less than three years. See Ehrenberg, Danziger,
and San (1983), particularly footnote 21.) This topic
undoubtedly warrants further research.References
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